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Introduction
This submission addresses points 1.c, 3.a, and 4.a of the Committee’s terms of reference:
issues pertaining to the stability of the finance sector, its impact on the economy, and the
objectives and procedures of the Reserve Bank. It outlines the Financial Instability Hypothesis
(FIH), which argues that the 91-93 recession was the result of a debt deflation, and that such
events are likely to recur in a deregulated financial system. Its policy recommendations are:
1)the need for an index of financial fragility as a guide to monetary (and fiscal) policy;
2)the inappropriateness of high interest rates as a control mechanism during booms.
The Financial Instability Hypothesis
The FIH was developed the American economist Hyman Minsky as an explanation of the
Great Depression. Minsky’s explanation begins with the observation that any period of relative
economic calm has always been preceded by a period of economic distress.
In the immediate aftermath to the crisis, both businessmen and banks are extremely cautious,
and this is reflected in conservative valuation of investment projects, and a desire to minimise
debt to equity ratios. However, as economic stability persists and the crisis fades into memory,
both businessmen and banks become more confident. Expectations thus rise during a period of
tranquil growth: as Minsky puts it, “Stability--or tranquility--in a world with a cyclical past
and capitalist financial institutions is destabilising” (Minsky, 1982, p. 101).
Rising expectations lead to rising investment, rising asset valuations, increased willingness on
the part of business to go into debt to acquire assets, and increased willingness on the part of
bankers to finance those asset purchases. In part these expectations are self-fulfilling: rising
expectations increase both investment and the rate of growth of the money supply (Minsky
argues that the money supply is “endogenous”--a function of economic activity--rather than
“exogenous”--set by a non-market agent, such as the Reserve Bank), which in turn increase
the rate of economic growth, further fuelling the rise in expectations.
The economy then passes into a boom stage which Minsky characterises as “the euphoric
economy” (Minsky, 1982, p. 120-124.) . The preceding caution gives way to a euphoria in
which both lenders and borrowers believe that the future is assured, and therefore that most
investments will succeed.
This environment allows the emergence of speculators who profit by borrowing money to
trade in assets, whom Minsky calls “Ponzi financiers”. The rate of asset price inflation is by
this stage significantly higher than the rate of interest, making these speculators willing to pay
high rates of interest to acquire the funds they need for asset speculation, and this drives the
rate of interest higher still.
Eventually, euphoria reaches its time limit. On one hand, the level of returns being anticipated
exceeds the physical capacity of the economy to generate profits. On the other, rising interest
rates make many originally conservative investments potentially unprofitable. This inspires
their initiators to consider selling these assets, and the entry of these new sellers into the assets
markets halts the exponential rise in asset prices on which Ponzi financiers depend. Highly
geared firms start to fail, Ponzis go bankrupt as the asset price bubble bursts, and suddenly the
euphoria collapses into a panic. Both firms and bankers become pessimistic about the
prospects for successful investment, leading to a collapse in both investment and speculative
activities. Banks try to rein in their credit exposure while firms focus solely upon reducing
their level of debt, and both actions lead to a collapse in the growth of money--and a new
crisis.
What happens after the crisis depends on the rate of inflation, and the behaviour of
government. With the collapse in asset prices and investment, the main problem confrontingthe economy is the disparity between the interest payments needed to finance the debt
accumulated in purchasing assets, and the cash flows expected from these assets in the now
depressed economy. If the underlying rate of inflation is high, then the rising price level
eventually brings cash flows and debt servicing into balance, enabling debts to be repaid. This
avoids a depression, but leads to what in the 70s was called Stagflation--the coincidence of
high inflation and low growth. Prompt government intervention (lowering taxes, increasing
spending and guaranteeing liquidity to financial institutions) can also generate sufficient cash
flow for firms to repay their debt, and thus let the system limp out of the crisis---into yet
another cycle. On the other hand, a low inflation rate (and no government intervention) can
mean that debts can never be repaid: firms go bankrupt, eventually so do banks,  the economy
undergoes debt-deflation and enters a Depression.
A dynamic economic model of debt-deflation
This section outlines an economic model which shows that a debt deflation can result simply
from the interaction of three manifest facts:
{ Workers wage demands are higher during booms than slumps;
{ Investment is higher during booms than slumps;
{ Banks lend money at interest to finance investment.
While these propositions are obvious and seemingly innocuous, their combination can generate
a debt deflation, if the rate of interest is relatively high. The explanation for this is quite
intuitive: it is possible for firms to borrow more during booms than they are able to repay
during slumps.
The three key variables in this model are the rate of employment, the wages share of output,
and bankers share of output (see Keen 1995 for complete details). With a low real rate of
interest, these variables converge to a stable equilibrium. With a high rate of interest, the
outcome is quite different. While initial indications are that the model is, once again,
approaching a stable equilibrium, the stability gives way to increased cycles and eventually
complete breakdown:
These two scenarios stand in stark contrast when plotted in 3 dimensions:
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Low Interest RatesThe economic interpretation of this system is fairly straightforward. If the initial sum of
workers’ and bankers’ share of output is low, profit share will be high and desired investment
will exceed the profits of firms. Firms then borrow to finance this desired investment, leading
to both rising debt and rising growth. The higher rate of growth leads to higher employment
and, eventually, demands for higher wages, which (along with the increased level of debt)
reduce profits, investment, and hence growth. If the real rate of interest is below a critical level
(4.6% in these simulations), then this cyclical process eventually stabilises as the debt/output
ratio, employment rate and wages share taper towards a stable equilibrium. If the rate of
interest exceeds this level, then the system initially appears to gravitate towards this point, but
the debt ratio continues to rise, as firms continue to accumulate more debt during booms than
they are able to liquidate during slumps. The booms and slumps themselves at first attenuate,
as increasing bankers’ share reduces the maximum profit share achieved, and thus reduce the
rate of accumulation of new debt; however, they eventually start to grow in magnitude, as the
reduced average growth level leads to progressively lower wages share of output, which for a
while cyclically counters the depressing effect of higher debt on profits. Eventually, the level
of debt becomes such that the “exponential” side of the debt relation overwhelms the system,
investment ceases and with it economic growth, and the economy collapses.
To this point, the model is an explanation for a complete breakdown, such as occurred during
the Great Depression. Minsky’s argument that this total calamity can be prevented if the
government which follows counter-cyclical tendencies is illustrated by introducing a
government sector whose rate of change of tax is a function of the rate of profit, and whose
rate of change of subsidies is a function of the  level of unemployment. This approximates
government behaviour during the 1950s and 1960s, when progressive tax rates were the norm,
and when the government was expected to run a deficit during recessions. Minsky argues that
the Keynesian stabilisation policies of the 1945-73 period worked, not because they eliminated
cycles, but because they prevented debt-deflations of the kind that occurred in 1929-33
(Minsky, 1982, p. xiii). A government sector which increases taxes during booms, and
increases spending during slumps, likewise makes a debt deflation impossible in this model:
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High Interest RatesThe Australian economy lies between these two extremes, of a economy without government
intervention, and one with a government dedicated to counter-cyclical stabilisation policies.
This is especially so in relation to the absence of government stabilisation policies during the
boom stage of the cycle. It is therefore quite likely that debt deflations will occur, though it is
also probable that non-discretionary changes to government taxation and spending during the
slump will mean that the economy will avoid a complete debt deflation.
The 1983-91 Period
A review of Australia’s economy during the 1983-91 period makes it apparent that the
Financial Instability Hypothesis should be taken seriously. The preceding crisis was the
downturn of 1981-83, when the economy registered near-zero or negative growth for seven
consecutive quarters. The period began with the economy recovering strongly, recording 9%
growth in the first four quarters, and this strength was maintained, with only 3 of the following
28 quarters registering a fall in GDP.
This solid economic performance led business sentiment to rise to euphoric levels. This
optimism was manifested in asset prices, which underwent a far greater boom than the
underlying economy was experiencing. The Stock Market rose  over 380% from its previous
low in March 82 to its peak in October 87, whereas the real GDP rose by only 21% and
consumer prices only 52% over the same period. Callen’s index of assets prices rose 160%
between March 82 and its peak in December 89, at the height of the real estate boom,
compared to a 30% increase in real GDP and 80% rise in the CPI.. The money supply also
behaved as Minsky predicted: M3 rose by over 200% between March 82 and December 89,
compared to a 130% increase in nominal GDP.
These euphoric conditions led to the emergence of a welter of Australian Ponzi financiers:
corporate and individual names such as Bond, Skase, Connell, Adsteam and many others were
regarded as business icons as they profited enormously from asset speculation, only to crash
even more spectacularly in the 87-91 period.
The severity of the crash was exacerbated by the conjunction of low inflation rates and high
interest rates with historically high levels of corporate debt. The AGSM 1950-1985 database
of company annual reports shows that in the 1950s, our major companies on average declared
profits five times the size of their interest commitments. The 81-83 downturn had reduced the
profit/interest cover from 2.67 in 1980 to 0.98 in 1983; though it recovered to 1.45 in 84, by
85 it had fallen to 1.24, in the very early days of the explosion in corporate debt levels. The
ratio would surely have been below one when the boom finally collapsed in 1989/90, at a time
when the rate of inflation was 5% and the rate of interest on overdrafts exceeded 20%.
Though the policy objective behind these high interest rates was to slow the level of
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Cycles kept within Limitsspeculative investment, particularly in real estate, their real impact was to accelerate the rate of
accumulation of debt, thus making the eventual collapse more severe.
Policy Recommendations
The FIH argues that cycles are inevitable in an economy with a sophisticated financial system.
The key objective of monetary and fiscal policy should be to prevent the cycles reaching a
degree of severity where a debt deflation is possible. If a debt deflation nonetheless occurs,
then monetary policy should not exacerbate it. This submission therefore makes the following
recommendations
(a) That an index of financial fragility should be developed
The index would provide an objective measure of the extent to which the economy is
susceptible to a debt deflation. This index would combine data on the level of corporate
indebtedness, the rates of asset price and consumer price inflation, price volatility on finance
markets, and interest rates.
(b) A revised approach to interest rate policy
Conventional economic theory assumes that the level of investment can be manipulated by
varying the rate of interest. In contrast, the FIH argues that business expectations are the main
determinant of investment. Interest rate variations are therefore  a limited tool, and their
effectiveness is mainly confined to the stable stage of the economic cycle. At the boom and
slump stages, the main impact of interest rate variations is not upon the rate of interest, but
upon the rate of accumulation of debt. A high rate of interest during a boom does not
constrain speculative investment, but instead causes a rapid growth in debt levels which can
lead to a deflation. Similarly, a low rate of interest during a slump will not revive investment,
but it will slow the rate of accumulation of debt.
Interest rate policy should therefore be conditional upon the degree of financial fragility of the
economy. When the economy is stable, according to the index, variations in interest rates can
be expected to alter economic activity in the desired directions. When the economy is fragile,
interest rate policy is unlikely to be able to control speculative behaviour, and high interest
rates are only likely to exacerbate the eventual downturn. In the immediate aftermath to a
crisis, interest rates should be reduced to as low a level as possible to reduce the rate of
accumulation of debt.
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